To the charms of wit, and the most polite imagination she joined an uncommon strength of judgment, and to the most refined sentiments a learned curiosity. Superior to the rest of her sex, without being solicitous to appear so, she could talk of ornament and dress whenever there was occasion for it, and ask proper questions upon more important subjects., A natur~l negligence, an easy unaffectedness imbellished all she said. She had beauty enough to gain her consort many friends, and was judicious enough not to shew anyone a particular regard, and these accomplishments being seldom found united except in books and the imagination of authors, is the reason, I believe, that learning in ladies does not meet with so universal an applause from the world as their beauty.
Tvvo further quotations, of which the first is worthy of perpetua tion for its own sake, will show the tenor of the book:
The mathematicians, answered I, are said to resemble lovers. If what you grant them at first be ever so little, they know how to make so good an advantage of it, as to lead you insensibly f~rther than you ever imagined.
These refractions of the rays of light which were known though very imperfectly to the Antients, and to the consideration of which we in great measure owe the perfection of Astronomy, are the cause of an infinite number of strange and amusing phaenomena, which we every day observe; such as objects appearing out of place when viewed ·through a prism, an oar broken in the water, and the surprize of seeing ourselves deformed and crooked when in a bath. This is the very thing, said she, interrupting me, that I lately observed when I was in the bath, and I' was extremely surprized and p~zzled to · find au t the reason of it. It is nothing else, answer'd I, but the refraction which the rays suffer in passing from air into water.
These are relicsof an age that has utterly disappeared. In the eighteenth century Science was a playful girl who whispered of conic sections, putrefaction; and refraction in the ears of bishops and marchionesses. Now she is a stem matron who stands beside the chair in every council of war or industry. Upon her devotees she has impressed 349 THE UNIVERSITY ' OF TORONTO QUARTERLY a deadly seriousness, a puritanic in~ensity which turns scientists collectively, and (alas) often individually, into very dull dogs indeed. Their only relaxation is to rise occasionally from their desks or benches, stand to attention, raise their right arms in the air, shout "Hail, Science!" and resume' their seats. No time is wasted. With set faces they press on to-what? The nineteenth century was filled with the idea of progress. The immediate objectives were clearly envisaged and often attained. Among such might be included a more moral and ordered life, a safer and longer life, increased tolerance, speed, comfort, peace, knowledge, indeed all the things which we of our age group under the title of civilization. But however admirable these things may be in the limited measure found possible of attainment, each one of them contains its corresponding disadvantage when pushed to excess. An excessiv~ly moral and ordered life may become hypocritical and dull; tolerance is not always reciprocated; knowledge in excess makes man self-conscious and turns him from action to in trospection. The road which spread out so smoothly a century ago is now, we see, leading unexpectedly into co un try which is both' dangerous and monotonous. On this optimistic journey science was the guide, and it is towards science that man turns with mingled feelings of j'ndignation and hope.
To what ultimate goal is science pressing? To that question no answer can be given, if for no other reason than because the word "science" has acquired so wide a meaning as to mean little or nothing. Everything from the simplest mechanical contrivance to an axiomatic basis for geometry falls under this title. I t has almost come about that every common-sense statement is described as "scien tific.'" '
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If we cannot drive the money-changers from the temple of science, let us at least force them and the world to realize that it is a temple. The disinterested search for truth is a strange employment ·for man; such, at least, must be the democratic decision in view of the small numbers engaged in it. Life is admittedly a hard business for most; even if it were not, there would be no a priori reason why such a search for truth should be undertaken for its own sake. For us as scientists to' assert that the search for truth as such is in any absolute sense a noble occupation, is to arrogate to our own fundamental motives an absolute importance which history belies. At our best we are saints, perhaps martyrs, at our worst monkeys itching with curiosity, to whom nothing is sacred; the evaluation of our importance may run the whole way from one extreme to the other according to the evaluator.
A great genius moves undeflected by moral scruples: convinced of his own importance, he goes uninfluenced by the praise or blame of his own age, secure in the conviction that posterity will evaluate him as he considers he deserves. But wi th those of us who fall short of this egotism of genius, there may be searching of consciences. We are moral beings in a moral age, and we ask ourselves from time to time whether our occupations are truly moral. . Is the pursuit of truth for its own sake a moral occupation, or is it merely a pandering to the monkey-itch of curiosity? Scientists, whether troubled in their consciences or not, ate wont to spread before society a dazzling display of achievement. "Let us," they say, ('pursue tru th for its own sake, and everything you wan t will ultimately turn up. The abstr-act search for truth in hydrodynamics, for example, may not seem to you of any importance, but if our work ultimately enables you to cross the Atlantic jn a day, or bomb your enemies 351 more effectively for that matter, you must admit that it has its value for civilization."
I fear that if anyone of us were to examine his activi ties to assess their moral value (as moral value is understood among us to-day), he would be sorely puzzled how to behave. Those who, like Tolstoi, have tried to be logical and consistent in this, are not generally regarded as having achieved their object or created a desirable precedent. The moral examination of our conduct is apt to fizzle out in a maze of c~mplexity, and fundamental instincts assert themselves as a guide. In fact, the scientist, faced with the maze of moral law, will either believe (to save himself worry, leading to neglect of his ,work) that the moral law is on his side, or he will boldly say that in the moral law one of the first demands is the disinterested pursuit of knowledge, whether it ultimately heal or kill.
In setting up as a goal the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, the scientist proclaims himself neither the friend nor enemy of society, but emphatically the friend of truth. By attaching importance to things which are held as of no account by his fellows, he cu ts himself off, and between him and them there exists a perpetual, if partly concealed, animosity. The so-called "humanist" and the scientist live side by side and tolerate one another. That they should maintain a common front for certain purposes is inevitable, for they both represent the academic side of life: to the man in the street their differences are trivia1.compared with the vast gulf which separates their points of view from his, but in academic circles there has been, and ' still is, a fight between two in teres ts-knowledge for its own sake and knowledge of direct human interest. Let us not be deceived by the fact that academic interests form al1 almost continuous spectrum: the two ends of the spectrum are poles apart.
I t is not my purpose to predict -a future in which all in tellectual in terests are common and clashes are no more. The strife of conflicting interests is the sign of life. Rather do I wish to challenge the claim of "humanistic" pursuits to be humanistic in the full Ii teral sense, and further to define the position of science with regard to culture.
If we compare the culture of Western Europe (including its ramifications. in America) from 1600 to the presen t day with any other culture, it may, I think, be claimed that its most characteristic feature is the development of scientific curiosity and its adequate satisfaction. From the human point of view we may rightly refuse to be impressed by external material progress. We may hold that to travel in an aeroplane or listen to the radio does not radically change human nature: if it did, all human cuI ture more than ~ hundred years old would be unintelligible to us. lt is rather to the cause of material progress, the abstract scien tiflc spiri t, that we are-to look if we are to find the characteristic of our age. I t is true that our age might be compared to that of ancient Greece, to which we owe the ·scien tific spirit. But our developmen t has so far surpassed that of the Greeks that no . serious comparison is possible. They wooed Science like gentlemen; we have pursued her with violence and wrested from her secrets which they would not have though t her capable of concealing. The Greeks faced nature_with preconceptions; it has been left to us in these last three centuries to begin by admitting our inferiority and to proceed to an unrivalled knowledge. How then can we, who belong to this age, desert be as the "humanities" a domain of culture which excludes the characteristic ingredient of our own culture? The word "humanities," applied to the exclusion of science, seems to imply that scientists are .either gods or devils. This is a medieval attitude. They are neither, but the exponents of what is the most essential fibre in our in'tdlectual life.
But is science really a part of culture? Is there not something trivial, almost indecent, in the pre-occupation displayed by mature men in apparently insignificant phenolnena? Is this monkey-itch of curiosi ty to be held for a virtue, and are the theories evolved to satisfy it to be placed beside the greatest achievements of Ii terature or art? . To each question the answer is "Yes" or uNo" according to the responden t~ I t is a case where no faith can be brought to the unbeliever: for hilTI scientific thought is a mystery and will remain so: it does not interest him: why should. he pay lip-service to what he does not understand and secretly despises? Bu t there are also those who waver in their reply-scientists filled with the scien tific urge and devoting their lives to it, and yet not completely free from a feeling that there is some inferiority attached to science.
Believing as I do that science is an essential part ·of culture, and that in the universities it is a part of culture which transcends the so-called humanities, let me try to state my reasons for this belief. To attempt any such defence of science-or perhaps offence on its behalf----=--seems to imply a certain arrogance. To do it adequately would require the effron tery of Bernard Shaw combined with the accomplishments of Leonardo da. Vinci. But each of us is confined wi thin his narrow sphere of knowledge and to break bOl:1nds is immodest in any on· e of us. So, without any implication of competence, let me state my reasons.
The aesthetic elemen t is an essential part. of cuI ture, 354 and by the presence or absence of the aesthetic element in science its claim to inclusion in the realm of culture stands or falls. Has science an aesthetic element? The captious will ask, "What is an aesthetic element?" The type of answer best suited to this question is illustrated by the answer given a few' years ago to the question, "What is geometry?"-which is a much more subtle question than the non-mathematician n1ay imagine: Veblen and Whitehead say that " . . . a branch of mathematics is called a geometry because the name seems good, on emotional and traditional grounds, to a sufficient number of competent people." Let us then, as "competent" people, agree that we have a common understanding as to the meaning of an "aesthetic element." Has science got such?
Here let me beat a retreat from an untenable position of omniscience behind the fortifications of knowledge, which in my case cover only a small domain of mathell1atics, more particularly its applications to physics and allied natural phenomena. To the question as to whether science ii1 this field con tains an aesthetic elemen t, I answer with a most definite affirmative. But to attempt to convey to the unconvinced the significance of this belief, or to describe with any precision the nature of the aesthetic element, is beyond lny power. To illustrate, I know no Russian. There is, I understand, good poetry in Russian (a strong aesthetic element), but it is un.;. translatable, as nearly all poetry is. I t is shut off from lne, bu t it exists (I believe) in an unknown language.
In the sa' me way the aesthetic elelnen t in mathematics lies hidden in a language unknown to many, and anyone who would know it save through the medium of the language of mathematics asks the impossible.
Yet it may be assumed (to pursue our poetic analogy)
that Russian poetry probably resembles the poetry of any other country in broad outline: we can believe in its existence because, without reading it, we can foretell the type of aesthetic emotion it would probably arouse in us.
Is there not any such indirect way in which one may comprehend the aesthetic element in mathematics? It seelns not; the language is unique. The most we can do is to attempt a description of the matter dealt with. This would be analogous to making a prose translation of the poeln, and may be done, but the aesthetic element drops out in the process. It is a 'profi tless undertaking, like a boring description of the plot of a novel or play.
Nor have I much sympathy with those scientists who popularize and dramatize, attempting to create an atmosphere of understanding where there is no real understanding. That caution which is at the heart of science is thrown -to the winds, and enthusiasm is asked to take fhe place of knowledge. The aesthetic element does not survive this rough trea tmen t. Without ever hoping to convey to the uninformed or unsympathetic the true essence of the aesthetic elelnent in science, one.may attempt to point out certain parallels~ In science and in every other art there are (i t would seem) two sources of aesthetic satisfaction) that of assimilation and that of cteation. As always, assimilation is easier than creation) and the satisfaction proportionately less intense. Again) as appears to be the case in any art, the greatest scientific creations have a certain ele1n:ental simplicity. Consider, for example, Euclid's geometry or the gravitational theory of Newton.
Let us pass now to the most con troversial claim, that in universi ties the scien tific though t cons ti tu tes a more important part of culture than the so-called "humanities," which for convenience and courtesy :we may refer to simply -as the hUlnanities, although in so far as they claim to cover the cultural activities of modern man, they are, as I have tried to indicate, incomplete. The reason is not far to seek: I have referred to assimilation and creation. By tradition) the universities assimilate the humanities, they do not attempt consistently to create. Art (in the ordinary sense) is still looked on somewhat askance, and literatUre is not created directly by , the universItIes. This does not of course imply that the universities do not influence the creators of literature) but no serious claim to parentage could be put forward.
On the other hand, from the beginning of our present era, science has been closely connected with the univerSl tIes. 'fhere have been cases of men not working in universities, or associated institutions, who have . been creators of the first o~der, but in the main the progress has come from the universities. An ambitious university man in the humanities sets out with the comparatively low ambition of assimilation: his publications will not be) except accidentally as it were) freshly created work of aesthetic value. He works at s' econd hand. The same is true to a great extent of the scientist also, but with the important difference that the ambitious wil1 not stop (and will be expected by his university not to stop) at assimilation. He is expected to create. At the presen t day the universities perhaps expect too much too soon in the way of creation: 'assimilation may suffer. But the difference in the points of view of the universities with regard to science and the humanities is noteworthy, and it i~, I think, sufficient to substantiate the claim that science, far from being a tolerated interloper in the domain of cu1ture in the universities, contributes to culture the only creative element which the universities make it their business to contribute.
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But having gone so far, I tremble to realize how dangerous is the intrusion of a Inathematician into the realm of words. I find myself writing of "science" as' of a term well understood, whereas I have been at pains to point out earlier that it is a word which carries little exact meaning to-day. An experimentalist carrying out a routine experiment, or a mathematician solving a routine probleln, is' not engaged in an act of creation containing a valid aesthetic elelnent. . The nun1ber of really great creations,in a century, even, is not large. That does not, however, lessen the importance of the fact that these creations, when they do come, come from the universities, and that a student of science may step out on an academic career with the high hope that there is a baton in his knapsack. There is no reason for him to suppose that he is cuI turally inferior to those· who never expect to create in the humanities: his work is to make civilizationtheirs ·is to study it.
